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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

#### Item #4 - Policy and Planning Support

Listed below are some of the significant administrative actions taken by this Division in support of the Executive Officer and the Director of Security or his Deputy in response to outside requests (FY 1972):

- 1. Commendations (OS)
- 2. DCI and DDCI Briefing Logs
- 3. Security Clearance Review
- 4. Dulles Papers
- 5. Protection of Classified Information
- 6. Public Understanding of the Role of Intelligence
- 7. Legislation of Concern to CIA
- 8. Briefing Logs for Executive Director-Comptroller
- Special Approval and Justification for Requisitioning Safes and File Equipment
- 10. Bills Introduced to Assure Classified Information is Disseminated to Congress
- 11. Request for Information or Recommendation (Freedom of Information Act)
- 12. The Recruiter's View on Youth and the Agency Image
- 13. Briefing of the Under Secretary of the Navy
- 14. Law and Order Day Ceremonies, National Police Officers Association of America, 9 October 1971, Wichita, Kansas

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- 15. Organization of Former Employees of CIA
- 16. Guidelines Governing Disclosure of Classified Intelligence
- 17. Classification of OS Investigative Reports
- 18. Possible Compromise of Classified Information
- 19. Briefing of Dr. Albert C. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- 20. Nuclear Planning Group, NATO
- 21. Travel Orders
- 22. Proposal for Mutual Abolition of Closed Area Restrictions with
  - 23. United States Court of Approvals Concerning Defense Classification
  - 24. Q Clearance Survey

25X1A

- 25. Reference to CIA in GAO Reports on Medical Support on Refugee Programs in the second seco
  - 26. Intra-Agency Groups
  - 27. Security Interface with the Department of State on Mutual Support Problems
  - 28. Clearance of Clerical Employees
  - 29. Forrestal Diaries (Declassification)
  - 30. Security Support of the New Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
  - 31. Briefing Material for the 1973 Congressional Budget Presentation
  - 32. Overclassification and Declassification of Information

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- 33. FYI Allegations and Answers
- 34. Recommendations Concerning a Microfilm Application for SR&CD Files
- Proposed DCI Statement Before the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives (Nedzi Committee)
- 36. Request for "Fact Booklet" Committee
- 37. Proposed Agenda for Meeting on Planning
- 38. Procedures for Issuance of U.S. Savings Bonds
- 39. Current Review of Director of Central Intelligence.
  Directives
- 40. Defense Against the Assassination or Kidnapping of Certain Government Officials, Report of Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) dated 8 March 1972
- 41. Proposed Publication of CIA Related Documents in the Department of State's Foreign Relations Series
- 42. Delegations of Authority to Classify National Security Information
- 43. Vulnerability Study of Non-CIA Facilities
- 44. Revisions of EO 10501
- 45. Implementation of EO 11652 and Related NSC Directive
- 46. Intra-Agency Security Committee Activities



#### Item #10 - Unauthorized Disclosures

Listed below are action papers involving unauthorized disclosures. Coordination was effected with the Special Security Center as required:

- 1. Unauthorized Disclosures in the News Media
- 2. Possible Unauthorized Disclosures in the News Media - 1959 through 31 December 1968
- 3. "Anderson Papers" (Jack Anderson--Washington Post Newspaper)
- 4. "Anderson Papers" Investigation (Preliminary Report)
- 5. Unauthorized Disclosures Washington Post Articles 17, 19, 21, 24, 27, and 28 December 1971 by Jack Anderson
- 6. "New Spy Satellites Planned for Clearer, Instant Pictures," Washington Post Article by Michael Getler (3)
- 7. Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information (Article Entitled "U.S. Girds for Survival in Electronic Warfare" Published 21 February 1972 in Aviation Week & Space Technology
- 8. Washington Post Article, "The Air War" by Mr.
  Peter Osnos dated 17 April 1972

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GOAL	PRIORITY NO.	Is objective being performed as required by OS mission/functions		COORI	DINA T'ION	REDUCTIONS/SAVINGS		
		Yes	Partially	No	Internal	External	Personnel	Funds-
Administration and Support (See Tab A)	1	х	25X1A		NA	NA	No Reducti	
Reports	2	x			NA	Req by DDS and other CIA officials	No Reductio	on/Savings
USIB Security Committee Activities	3	x			NA	DCID 1/11		
NDPC Activities	. 4	x			NA	NDPC 1/2	No Reductio	n/Savings
Budgetary (Program Submission)	5	х			NA	DDS OPPB	No Reductio	on/Savings

# OS GOALS/PRIORITIES REPORT

GOAL	PRIORITY NO.	Is objective being performed as required by 500 Amission/functions		COORD	INATION	REDUCTIONS/SAVINGS		
		Yes	Partially	No	Internal	External	Personnel	Funds
CIA Regulations and Notices	6	x			NA	NA	No Reductio	on/Savings
Records Management	7	×			NA	DDS, ExDir Compt	No Reductio	m/Saving:
Unauthorized Disclosures (See Tab A)	8	x			АИ	NA	No Reductio	n/Savings
OS Directives and Notices	9	x			NA	NA	No Reduction	n/Savings
Legislative and Executive Orders	10	x			NΑ	NA	No Reductio	n/Savings

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# OS GOALS/PRIORITIES REPORT


GOAL	PRIORITY NO.	Is objective being performed as required by OS mission/functions			COORDI	NOITAN	REDUCTIONS/SAVINC		
		Yes	Partially	No	Internal	External	Personnel	Funds	
Historical Program	11	x			NA	DDS, CIA Historical Staff	No Reducti	on/Savi	
NIS and SNIE Security Reviews	12	x	·		NA	Req by	No Reducti	on/Saving:	
CIA Board of Review	13	x			NA	25X1A	No Reducti	on/Saving	

## ORGANIZATION OF THE SPECIAL SECURITY CENTER

- 1. The Special Security Center (SSC) as an element of the Executive Staff, Office of Security is structured as a staff organization (Figure 1) which permits a division of specialized activities under authority delegated from the Director of Security according to function.
- 2. The SSC may also be viewed as a line organization (Figure 2). Authority is passed down directly from the Chief, Executive Staff to the Chief, SSC to the subordinate officers in charge of particular activities. Each section on the same level of authority is a complete, independent self-contained unit. The head of each section is supreme in his own field and is responsible only to the Chief of the SSC. Contact between these sections is established through the Chief, SSC.
- 3. In practice, it is found that the SSC operates best as a combined line-and-staff organization because it combines the best features of both structures. Control is maintained through the clear-cut and individual delegation of authority and responsibility while operating efficiency is maintained through the flexible employment of available specialists and manpower. This approach also satisfies the need for coordinating the work of the specialists and forces them to look beyond their individual fields to the aims of the Center as a whole. We are thus able to pool abilities, experience and judgment; furnish a clearing house for common problems; secure a meeting of the minds to appraise results; broaden the viewpoint of members and develop new leadership.

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Attachment to: SSC-0217-72 FIGURE 2



The Special Security Center Structured as a Line Organization

Figure 2

#### SOURCES OF AUTHORITY

#### A. Security Policy Standards.

I. The TALENT Security Officer will be responsible to the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) and will be charged with inspecting and reporting to the SIO to ensure that his respective organization is complying with all of the basic standards required under the TALENT Control System. He should be available to meet periodically for the purpose of examining TALENT security problems with the TALENT Security Officer designated by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Chapter iii E. 2. The TALENT Control System Manual, 1956

The TSO/CIA is appointed by the Director of Security and serves in the Special Security Center, CIA.



The Director of Security, CIA is responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence for the development of security policy and for the overall management of the Control System.

SEGRET

Attachment to: SSC-0217-72 TAB D

The Director of Security in turn has delegated these responsibilities to the Chief, Special Security Center (SSC), Office of Security, CIA.

25X1A
Section V B, Control
System Manual, 1970

- 4. "This Center will consolidate and be responsible for the following security functions presently handled separately by DPD, the CIA COMINT Officer, TSO/CIA and NPIC.
- (e) Establish and maintain uniform procedures and control mechanisms for the protection of the sensitive information and material under control of the Center."

Establishment of the Special Clearance and Control Center, March 1962

5. (1) "All Security functions should be transferred to the Office of Security along with two professional positions. . "

Memo for Executive Director-Comptroller from DDI dated 20 October 1969, Subject:
Proposed Disposition of Staff 25X1A
Functions and Positions

- (2) "In connection with the transfer of the activities of the SPINT Security Staff to the Special Security Center. . . certain of these functions should remain within the Special Security Center. . .
  - "--Coordinate and publish regulations and indoctrination manuals for SI.
  - "--Establishment of essential COMINT controls and procedures to achieve security of personnel, physical security areas and documents and information in CIA and in specified governmental offices outside the USIB structure."

Memo for Director of Security, Subject: "Realignment of Security Staff Functions" from Chief, Executive Staff, dated 14 January 1970, SSC-0018-70

25X1A

## B. The SSC is Charged with Simplifying Compartmented Controls.

"What I am looking for is a series of specific recommendations for action which can be taken within CIA without changes in the community compartmentation systems for the time being. These changes hopefully would ease the bureaucratic burden of our present compartmentation systems, encourage dissemination of material to those who need to know and improve compartmentation of truly delicate matters. I would hope might develop drafts of memoranda on which I could consult the Deputy Directors before implementing them as procedural changes within CIA."

Memo for Director of Security, Subject: "Compartmentation Systems", from Executive Director-Comptroller, dated 20 March 1972

#### C. <u>Uniform TOP SECRET Controls.</u>

- (1) On 10 May 1972 at the Deputy's Meeting, the Executive Director-Comptroller charged the Office of Security to establish a uniform control procedure for control of TOP SECRET material including Compartmented material.
- (2) At the Deputy's Meeting on 2 June, Mr. Colby expressed continuing interest in the results of Office of Security efforts along these lines and instructed that the uniform procedure be "no tighter than required by Executive Order 11652 for the protection of TOP SECRET material."

#### MISSION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The mission of the Special Security Center, under the general guidance of the Director of Security, CIA is to advise, assist and generally act for the DCI in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities set forth in NSCID No. I with respect to the establishment and compliance with policy standards for the protection of formally compartmented intelligence; and to develop centralized direction for the protection of compartmented intelligence. The current compartmented intelligence systems are TALENT/KEYHOLE and COMINT.

25X1A

2. As a staff element in the Executive Staff, Office of Security, the mission of the Special Security Center includes performance of duties assigned by the Director of Security.

#### The Functions of the Special Security Center are:

1. To develop and recommend to the members of USIB, policy standards for the compartmentation of, access to, and information on sensitive intelligence operations, activities and products within the purview of the TALENT/KEYHOLE and COMINT Compartmented Control Systems.

- 2. To formulate, coordinate and maintain instructions for guidance in the administration of special security procedures and controls by all echelons of participating departments and agencies, domestic and overseas activities including consultants and contractor support acitivities concerning:
  - (1) Personnel and physical security including document and equipment security.
  - (2) Automatic Data Processing and associated materials and functions.
    - (3) Information dissemination procedures.
- 3. To provide as requested security advice to committees of the USIB.
- 4. To provide similar services, advice and guidance to foreign governments participating in U.S. compartmented intelligence activities.
- 5. To conduct security briefings of those members of the non-USIB elements of the Executive Branch of the Government and staff members of CIA on the need to protect compartmented intelligence.

- 6. To review and survey the security standards, practices and procedures employed by USIB departments and agencies and their contractors in relation to approved compartmentation policies, procedures and controls; and to make recommendations for practical improvement to the USIB members concerned.
- 7. To provide security support in establishing secure control areas, clearances and the movement of documents and material for those civilian agenices of the government approved for access to and use of compartmented material, e.g., Department of Interior, NASA, President's Office of Science and Technology, Office of Management and Budget, Office of Telecommunication Policy, Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Project and others such as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, National Aeronautics and Space Council, and Institute for Defense Analysis.
- 8. To meet with any of the security officers in USIB and non-USIB agencies and their contractors and consultants dealing with compartmented materials to discuss and resolve security problems.

- 9. To summarize and brief the Director of Security and his staff on items contained in the DDI's daily finished intelligence products.
- 10. To provide day-by-day security support to the DDI including:
  - (1) Support to the CIA SIGINT Officer and TCO/CIA.
  - (2) Support to the Information Requirements Staff, DDI.
    - (3) Support to the DDI Security Officer.
    - (4) Support to the DDI Registries, OCI and NPIC.

- 11. To provide security support to Executive Secretary to the USIB groups dealing with SALT; including movement of intelligence materials to SALT sites, survey of SALT sites, coordination on SALT security matters with the Department of State, ACDA and the JCS.
- 12. To formulate uniform procedures within CIA for the control of compartmented intelligence materials and collateral TOP SECRET materials as directed by the Executive Director-Comptroller.
- 13. To formulate a series of recommendations as requested by the Executive Director-Comptroller for the simplification within CIA of compartmented control procedures.
- 14. To structure and conduct security reorientation programs as called for by DCID 1/14, "Uniform Personnel Security Standards and Parctices Governing Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information."
- 15. To serve the Support Directorate as Compartmented Intelligence Control Officers.
- 16. To serve as the CIA address of and TALENT/KEYHOLE mail from outside the Agency.
- 17. To provide personnel support to the Director of Security in his role of Chairman, Security Committee, USIB; to serve as CIA members of the Committee's Working Group, Study Group, Ad Hoc Panels, etc. on acitivities unrelated to compartmented matters.
- 18. To conduct investigations as directed by the Director of Security in event of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence.
  - 19. To review publications of former CIA staff personnel.
- 20. To perform other duties as assigned by the Director of Security.

#### CURRENT DUTIES AND ACTIVITIES

This section is included to point out a comparison between what the Special Security Center is officially charged with as listed (TAB E) in the previous statement and what the Special Security Center is able to accomplish with its present staff complement.

#### Develop Policy Standards.

The SSC recognizes that significant updating of its policy standards are indicated in review of today's needs for compartmented intelligence. With the exception of the subcompart- 25X1A mentation, little has been done in the T/KH area since 1956. Very little has been done with relation to the industrial and consultative spheres. The expanding interests of the civilian scientific community in satellite reconnaissance capabilities will force attention to possible needs for variation if not modification in standards with which the intelligence community is now comfortable. Further security guidance in the ADP field is a compelling need that the SSC has been able to address only on an ad hoc basis. The two recent charges of the Executive Director-Comptroller resulting from the Review are currently the subject of action within CIA under the chairmanship of the SSC. But lack of manpower and time renders SSC attention and capability to do necessary on-site reviews and investigations minimal.

#### Security Advice to USIB Committees.

The SSC is able to provide on-the-spot continuing advice to only the COMIREX. And even within this single committee is no longer able to provide an adviser to its seven subcommittees. Lack of manpower has precluded attendance at any meeting of the SIGINT Committee or its Satellite Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee for the past six months. Attention to the rewrite of

25X1A

DCID 6/3 under the SIGINT Committee (and its CIA implementing 120) was virtually terminated when the SSC was reduced a position at the retirement of Security advice to GMAIC, the Information Handling Committee, the Critical Collections Requirements Committee and the Communications Committee are not included in the purview of SSC capabilities except on an ad hoc basis.

25X1C



# Security Briefings.

The SSC is able to do very few of the security briefings. The majority of the in-house briefings are handled by CIB. Because of the overall pressures in these times of economies most of the in-house indoctrinations to compartmentation consist of reading a rather sterile book and signing a secrecy form. To of reading a more concrete example of numbers of briefings and where provide a more concrete example of numbers of briefings and where conducted—but not addressing quality, the SSC has compiled the following table. (See attached memo for C/SSC)

# Reorientation.

The DCID 1/14 requires security reorientation programs to be presented by departments and agencies participating in the compartmented control systems. No such program has been structured since DCID 1/14 was issued.



#### Support Civilian Agencies.

The SSC is not able, in our opinion, to provide an acceptable level of security support to the growing number of civilian agencies, study groups, scientific disciplines and special review groups with an authorized access to compartmented materials. A large number of locations have been approved to handle and retain compartmented materials on waivers.

#### Availability for Consultation.

The relationship between the SSC and other agencies is maintained on an acceptable level but there is no formal program of liaison meetings, seminars, or plain old fashioned get-togethers. Thus the SSC marks this function low in priorities but makes sure that time is always found, opportunity always made, and ad hoc requests always answered.

TAB G

# OS GUALS PRIORITIES REPORT

SSC-0217-72 TAB G

GOAL	PRIORITY NO.	required by	and the second of the second o	unctions  5X1A	danan da da Calda (1 dabi mash alƙa ƙaƙasa basa)	NATION	REDUCTIONS	to an observation of the
The state of the s	والمالية المالية	Yes	Partially	No	Internal	External	Personnel	Fund
blish and interpret policy standards on compart- mentation of sensitive intelligence for the U.S.	1	X (2) (a)			DCI	USIB & non-USII White Ho		s
	25X1C							
Prepare, coordinate and disseminate implementing manuals	2	X (2) (a)			DCI	USIB & non-USII	No Reduction Possible 25X6	
Simplify and unify compartmented controls	3	of Security Dir-Compt 20 March 1	to Director from Ex. in memo dtd 972, Subject: ntation Contr	ols	ExI	ir-Compt	No Reduction Possible	<b>S</b>
Develop uniform Top Secret controls in compliance with Executive Order 11652	4	Assignmen of Security DirCompt and 2 June meeting	at 10 May	*	ExI	ir-Compt ·	No Reduction Possible	s
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OS GOALS/PRIORITIES
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i i	PRIORITY NO.	Is objective required by	being perform OS mission/	med as functions 25X1A	COORDI	NATION	REDUCTION	NS/SAVINGS
GOAL	110.		Partially	No	Internal	External	Personnel	Funds
make my to account to providing the depth of the contraction of the co	ng ta maa managamaa da ahaa caas ga	Yes	der wat en ook fij 'n de die gevoerde gevoert die en die pakte on ook fin de steel die die die besteel die en Die noorde gevoerde	X	Therefore to an ampleted to a set on the sector of the	USIB	No Reduct	ons Possible
Serve as Security Advisor to USIB Committees, SIGINT, COMIREX, SECOM	5	gunnout the	Requested b We now pro on minimal ac	vide less cceptable	tee	Commit	d	
Support civilian agencies, White House, non-USIB in protection of compartmented	6	X (2) (k)	We now condu an minimum ading to cons	ict less acceptabl	DCI	White House, Branch Govit,	Ex of	t ons Possible
intelligence 25X1C	7		l by implicati	on in terr	ns DCI		No Redu	ons Possible
Conduct security briefings and debriefings on compart mented intelligence program and projects	8 ns	x (2) (g)	(Jd)	25X6	DCI	agenc		ctions Possibl
Conduct reorientations on security requirements of	9	function (2) (g)	by DCID 1/14 is not being c	carnied ou		•	-	
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OS GOALS/ PRIORITIES
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SSC-0217-72 TAB G Page 3

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GOAL	PRIORITY NO.	Is objective required by	being perform OS mission/fu	110000110	COORDIN	ه ۱۰۰۰ که دخوا کوا د درسته در میکارد. میادارد دور در این د	REDUCTIONS/SAVINGS
		Yes	Partially	No	Internal	External USIB &	Personnel Funda No Reductions Pos. ple
Available for consultation on	10	X (2) (k)		•	DCI	non-USII	
security problems related to compartmented intelligence			*		25X6		
Conduct security inspections	11]	X (2) (f) (n	) While respon	sible for	DCI	USIB member	SSC now conducts less than .5% of its mission
and surveys to insure com- pliance with compartmented intelligence policies and		been carry	ing it out more e and then only	than		& non- USIB &	in this area. No further cuts possible.
procedures in CIA and other		local non-	USIB sites		25X6		
agencies and participating  Sport the U.S. intelligencefforts in the SALT discussion	ions.	X (2) (p)			Director	of Securi and State	ty No Reductions Possible
Escorting material, survey storage site, coordination with State Security.	OH						No Reductions Possibl
Serve as the compartmented control office for the DDS	1 13	X			DDS		Mo Kettaerina z osassa
Serve as the CIA address for receipt of mail from outside	or 14	sponsibili	d as outgrowth ties as TSO/CI	of re-		DDS&T DDI &	, 1% of GS-1 \$250\;350 1% of GS-7 \$100)
CIA in matters of comparing mented 25X1A KH material	roved For Rel	BSO/CIA lease 2001/07/1	2 : CIA-RDP83B00	823R0007	700010084-8	(Army,	1

# os goals/Priorities REPORT

Numericania and SSC -0217-72 TAB G Page 4

	PRIORITY		being perforr						
GOAL	NO.	NO. required by OS mission/functions 25X1A			COORDI	NATION	REDUCTIONS/SAVING		
	· Order to control of the control of	Yes	Partially	No	Internal	External	Personnel	Funds	
Investigate leaks of compart- mented intelligence and security violations	15	X (2) (b) Being disc	narged only in	part.	D/Sec.		50% of GS-1- 20% of GS-7	2,000 \$14,500	
Daily support to the DDI including security support to CIA SIGINT Officer, security support to TCO/CIA,	16	X (2) (g)			D/Securi DDI	y and	If eliminated	complete	
security support on inter- national briefing trips, security support DDI/Security Officer	**								
Chairman, Security Committee, USIB	17	•	nsibility assig inction of the		D/Securi	У	13% of GS-14	Salary \$3,770	
Review publications from Office of Special Assistant Public Affairs and disseminat them to interested elements of the OS.	18 e	function of	nsibility grew the role of the ent in the Exec	SSC	D/Securi	y	6% of GS-16	Salary \$1,562	
		0004/07/40							
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OS GOALS/FRIORITIES
REPORT

SSC-0217-72 TAB G Page 5

GOAL	PRIORITY NO.	Y Is objective being performed as required by OS mission/functions 25X1A  Yes Partially No			COORD.	INATION	REDUCTIONS/SAVIA		
At 9:30 daily meeting of senior OS officers conduct briefing on contents of compartmented publications.	19	THE THE LANGE AND ASSESSMENT OF SECURITION ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT OF SECURITION ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT OF SECURITION ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT O	at direction o	X	D/Securi	Care and arrived the Contract of the Contract	10% of GS-1	and the same of the same of the	
Other duties as assigned by D/Security	Usually short dura given No. when they	tion l priority			D/Securi	Ly	Average 109 of GS-14	\$2,500	
•					Park and the state of the state				
								man and man an	
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